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Abstract 
It is sometimes argued that by using the revenues from environmental taxes to reduce 
distortionary taxes on labor, governments can reap a ‘double dividend’, namely, not only an 
improvement in environmental quality, but also a reduction in the efficiency costs associ- 
ated with raising public revenue. By employing a general equilibrium model, this paper 
finds that, contrary to common wisdom, environmental taxes typically render the overall tax 
system a less efficient instrument to finance public spending. Furthermore, high estimates 
for the marginal efficiency costs of existing taxes weaken, rather than strengthen, the case 
for environmental taxes. 
Keywords: Environmental tax; Excess burden; Second best; Double dividend 
JEL classification: H23; Q28 
1. Introduction 
In the face of growing concern about serious environmental problems, environ- 
mental taxation has attracted increasing attention as taxes can, at least in principle, 
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internalize the external effects of environmental damage. Furthermore, many 
economists have argued that environmental taxes are an efficient instrument for 
achieving environmental objectives (see, e.g, Baumol and Oates (1988) and Pearce 
and Turner (1990)). 
Some have gone even further to suggest that environmental taxes may yield 
benefits over and above a cleaner environment if the Laffer curve for these taxes is 
upward sloping; by using the revenues from environmental taxes to decrease other, 
distortionary taxes, the government can reduce the overall economic costs of 
financing public spending (see e.g. Repetto et al. (1992) and Nordhaus (1993)). In 
this way, it is argued, environmental taxes yield a ‘double dividend’ - not only a 
cleaner environment but also a less distortionary tax system. Indeed, high esti- 
mates for the marginal efficiency costs of the existing tax system have been put 
forward as an important argument in support of environmental taxes. To illustrate, 
in advocating carbon taxes, Pearce (1991) presents estimates for the deadweight 
losses of current tax systems (see also Oates (1991)). 
The objective of this paper is to explore under which conditions environmental 
taxes do indeed reduce the efficiency costs of financing public spending. To that 
end, it formulates a simple general equilibrium model of a small open economy. 
The model is designed to examine the interaction between, on the one hand, 
environmental taxes aimed at internalizing the external effects from pollution, and, 
on the other hand, distortionary taxes on labor designed to finance public 
spending. The model thus contains two distortions: first, an environmental distor- 
tion associated with the external effects of pollution and, second, a distortion in 
the labor market on account of a distortionary tax on labor income. 
The double dividend argument has also been explored by Bovenberg and Van 
der Ploeg (1994). This particular study assumes that taxes and spending are set 
optimally. Our paper, in contrast, belongs to the literature on tax reform (see, e.g. 
Ahmad and Stern (1984)) rather than that on optimal taxation. In particular, we 
explore the macro-economic impact and the welfare effects of an environmental 
tax reform, i.e. increasing pollution levies and using the revenues to cut distor- 
tionary taxes on labor. We believe that our paper is a useful complement to 
optimal tax exercises because the implementation of optimal tax structures typi- 
cally requires information that is not readily available. Hence, tax-reform analysis 
is important for policy making in practice. Our paper differs from Bovenberg and 
Van der Ploeg (1994) also because we take government spending to be exoge- 
nously given. Most policy discussions on the double dividend do indeed assume 
that government spending is kept constant. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 elaborates on the 
model. The next two sections present and interpret the effects of an increase in 
environmental taxes for the case where the revenues are used to reduce the tax rate 
on labor income. In order to understand the basic intuition behind the results, 
Section 3 examines the economic effects if environmental taxes are introduced in 
an initial equilibrium without any environmental taxes. The case with positive 
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initial environmental taxes is dealt with in Section 4. Section 5 presents some 
suggestions for extending the model. Finally, Section 6 contains the main conclu- 
sions. 
2. The model 
The model assumes a small open economy, which faces exogenous world-market 
prices for commodities and capital. Labor is immobile internationally. Hence, the 
wage rate is the only price that is determined endogenously. This section describes 
the main features of the model, which is contained in Table 1. The notation is 
explained at the end of the paper. 
Firm behavior: Production 
A representative firm supplies a single commodity (Y). A constant-returns-to- 
scale neo-classical production function (1.1) describes domestic production. Be- 
sides labor (L,) and capital (K), a third input (E) enters the production function. 
This input causes environmental damage when used in production. Accordingly, it 
is called the ‘polluting’ input and can be thought off as energy. 
The first-order conditions (1.2), (1.3), and (1.4) represent the implicit demands 
for, respectively, labor, capital, and the polluting input. The production function 
assumes that capital and the polluting input form a composite input before 
combining with labor (see Fig. 1). The particular production structure is chosen 
because empirical evidence suggests that energy and capital are complements. 
Capital is included to give the model a more realistic flavor. Moreover, it allows 
us to model labor as a better substitute for resources than capital. The non-profit 
condition (1.5) follows from the assumptions of constant returns to scale, perfect 
competition, and profit maximization. Price equations (1.6) and (1.7) link the prices 
faced by the firm (the so-called ‘producer’ prices) to the market prices of labor 
and the polluting input. 
Household behavior: Consumption and labor supply 
Household behavior is derived from optimizing utility (1.8). Households de- 
mand two consumption commodities. One of these commodities - the so-called 
‘polluting’ consumption commodity (D) - harms the environment when con- 
sumed. The other commodity is called the ‘non-polluting’ consumption commod- 
ity (C). ’ The substitution elasticity between the two consumption commodities is 
denoted by u4. 
In addition to these two consumption commodities, leisure (V) and environ- 
mental quality (M) (i.e. environmental services) enter utility (Fig. 2). Leisure is 
’ This commodity, however, may cause environmental damage when it is produced. 
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Table 1 
The model in levels 
Firms 
Production function 
First-order conditions 
Y = F[L,, N(K,E)I 0.1) 
(1.2) 
(1.3) 
0.4) 
Non-profit condition 
Price equations 
Households 
Utility function 
Household budget constraint 
First-order conditions 
PyY = P/L, + PJE + rK (1.5) 
Pf=(l+c,)P, (1.6) 
Pd=P,+t, (I.71 
U = U[M, H{V, Q(C, D)}] 
P,C + P,hD = P,L 
Price equation Pd” = Pd + t* 
Government 
Balanced budget 
Equilibrium on the labor market 
Balance of payments 
Environmental quality 
PgG = t,E + t,D + t,P,L 
L, = L, 
P,E + rK + PdD + P,C + PgG = PyY 
M = M(E,D) 
(1.8) 
(1.9) 
(1.10) 
(1.11) 
(1.12) 
(1.13) 
(1.14) 
(1.15) 
(1.16) 
(1.17) 
assumed to be weakly separable from the two produced commodities C and D. 
This enables us to solve the model analytically. Moreover, there is no strong 
empirical evidence suggesting that separability does not hold if we associate dirty 
consumption with energy use by households. The environment is a collective good 
and weakly separable from private goods. Accordingly, households take the 
quality of the environment as given. Just as the firms, they ignore the adverse 
effect of their demand for polluting goods on the quality of the environment. We 
thus abstract from altruism and Coasian bargaining. Households adopt the de- 
mands for leisure and the two consumption commodities as instruments to 
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K E 
Fig. 1. The production structure. 
optimize utility subject to a budget constraint (1.9). In particular, private consump- 
tion is constrained by labor income (P,L). The implicit expressions for labor 
supply (L,) and the demand for the two consumption commodities are given by 
the first-order conditions @lo), (Lll), and (1.12). Eq. (1.13) shows that the 
environmental tax on the polluting commodity raises the household price of this 
commodity <P,“) above its market price (P,). 
Government 
The government budget is balanced (see (1.14)). Government spending on 
public goods (G) is financed by three taxes: an ad-valorem tax on labor income 
(tl> and two specific environmental taxes. One of these latter taxes applies to the 
polluting consumption commodity demanded by households (t,). The other envi- 
ronmental tax is levied on the demand by firms for the polluting input into the 
production process (t,). 
C D 
Fig. 2. The structure ofthe utility function. 
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International trade and labor-market equilibrium 
All commodities (i.e. the polluting input, the two consumption commodities, 
the domestic output, and the public good) are tradable. Accordingly, their prices 
(before taxes) are determined on world markets and are exogenous to the 
economy. An example of a tradable polluting input and a tradable polluting 
consumption good is fossil fuel. Also the rate of return on capital is exogenous to 
the small open economy because capital is perfectly mobile internationally. ’ 
Labor, in contrast, is assumed to be immobile. Accordingly, the wage rate is the 
only price that is determined domestically. Expression (1.15) denotes labor market 
equilibrium. The balance-of-payments constraint (1.16) represents the budget 
constraint for the economy as a whole. The value of the domestic production of 
tradables constrains overall domestic demand for tradables. 3 As far as the 
relationship between the produced output and the commodities that are demanded 
by domestic agents is concerned, two alternative interpretations of the fixed 
producer prices Py, P,, Pd, PC, and Pg are possible. One interpretation is that the 
latter commodities are produced domestically. Producer prices are fixed because 
the rates of transformation are assumed to be constant. An alternative interpreta- 
tion is that the commodities that are demanded domestically are imported at fixed 
world-market prices. These goods are paid for by exports of domestically pro- 
duced commodities. 4 
Environmental relationships 
Expression (1.17) formalizes the inverse relationship between the quality of the 
natural environment and the demand for, respectively, polluting consumption 
commodities and polluting inputs into production. This relationship raises spatial 
and dynamic issues. The static model abstracts from lags between economic 
activity and environmental damage associated with stock-flow effects. If pollution 
crosses international borders, the link between, on the one hand, domestic con- 
sumption and production, and, on the other hand, the quality of the domestic 
natural environment, is weakened. 
Linearized model 
This paper examines the local behavior of the small open economy around the 
initial equilibrium. To that end, the model is log-linearized around the initial 
* Capital can also be interpreted as a tradable non-polluting input. 
3 In accordance with the Law of Walras, this constraint can be derived from equilibrium on the labor 
market (1.151, the non-profit condition (1.5), and the budget constraints of, respectively, households and 
the government (i.e. (1.9) and (1.14)). 
4 These two interpretations can also be combined: Some commodities (for example, the clean 
consumption commodity and the public consumption good) can be produced domestically while other 
goods (for example, the dirty goods, i.e. fossil fuels) are imported at exogenous world-market prices. 
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equilibrium. 5 Table 2 contains the log-linearized model. The notation is explained 
at the end of the table. A tilde (-> denotes a relative change, unless indicated 
otherwise. The prices of the tradable commodities and mobile capital are given 
from abroad. This paper assumes that these exogenous variables do not change. 
Appendix A solves the log-linearized model for changes in the two environmental 
taxes. In order to examine a change in the tax mix, we assume that the government 
keeps its own spending on public goods constant and adopts the (endogenous) tax 
rate on labor to balance its budget. 
The excess burden 
One can measure the welfare effects of small policy changes by the so-called 
marginal ‘excess burden’. 6 This marginal excess burden corresponds to the 
additional income that needs to be provided to the representative household to 
keep its utility at its initial level (i.e. without the policy shock). Hence, a positive 
value for the marginal excess burden indicates a loss in welfare. In order to 
provide more intuition for the welfare effects, three alternative expressions for the 
marginal excess burden are presented. 
The marginal excess burden (as a ratio to initial household income, P!,L), p, 
can be written as the sum of effects on the environmental and labor-market 
distortions (the various shares and elasticities are defined at the end of table 2): 7 
(2.1) 
The first term at the right-hand side of (2.1) stands for the effect on the 
labor-market distortion, which is due to a distortionary tax on labor income. In 
particular, the tax rate on labor income measures the marginal welfare gain 
associated with an additional unit of employment. Thus, if the tax rate on wage 
income is positive, an expansion of employment raises welfare. Intuitively, at the 
margin, the social benefits of employment exceed the social opportunity costs 
because the additional production from one additional unit of labor not only 
compensates the worker for giving up leisure but also yields tax revenue. Hence, 
by strengthening the economic base of the public sector, employment yields a 
public benefit to society over and above the compensation to the private supplier 
of labor. 
’ This procedure is based on Keller (1980). 
’ This burden is called the ‘excess’ burden because it corresponds to the loss in welfare over and 
above the revenues collected by the government. One can interpret the costs due to the excess burden 
as the ‘hidden’ costs of financing public spending because they are not reflected in tax revenue. 
’ See Appendix B for the derivation. This expression for the ‘marginal’ excess burden holds exactly 
only for infinitely small changes in taxes. It is an approximation for the welfare effects of larger 
changes. For a discussion of welfare measures, in general, and the marginal excess burden, in 
particular, see Fullerton (1991). 
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The last two terms at the right-hand side of (2.1) correspond to the effects on 
the environmental distortions, which are due to, respectively, pollution in con- 
sumption and in production. The welfare effect of a marginal increase in the 
demand for the polluting commodities is given by the difference between, on the 
one hand, a tax term, which measures the social benefits of additional tax revenue 
due to a wider tax base, and, on the other hand, the marginal social damage from 
pollution. In the absence of environmental taxes (i.e. Pd = /3, = O), cutting the 
demand for the polluting commodities enhances overall welfare because the social 
costs of pollution exceed the social benefits. In the presence of initial environmen- 
tal taxes, a lower demand for polluting commodities harms welfare if the 
‘tax-base’ effect exceeds the pollution effect. If the tax rate is set to fully 
internalize the external effects of pollution, the effect on the tax base exactly 
offsets the social damage of pollution (i.e. ( Pi/o,) = 718~ for i = d, e). In that 
case, the last terms at the right-hand side are zero and a marginal change in the 
demand for polluting commodities does not affect welfare. Intuitively, a higher 
demand for polluting commodities causes additional social costs in terms of 
environmental damage, which are exactly offset by the social contribution in terms 
of additional tax revenue. 
The marginal welfare effects differ from the overall welfare costs of the tax 
system as computed by Harberger (1974). Whereas Harberger measures the 
welfare costs of the tax system as a whole, we only consider marginal changes in 
welfare due to small tax reforms. Harberger in effect compares the tax system with 
the case of no taxes and hence analyzes large changes in taxes. Therefore, he 
considers not only first-order welfare effects but also the second-order effects. We 
believe that the case with no taxes at all is rather hypothetical and thus prefer the 
analysis of small changes in taxes. This has the additional advantage that only 
local information about the various elasticities is required. 
By rearranging the terms in expression (2.11, one can alternatively display the 
marginal excess burden as the sum of an effect on the tax base, 6’, and an effect 
on the quality of the environment, he: 
The effect on ‘environmental’ income, 6’, can be separated into the effects on 
environmental quality due to changes in household- and firm behavior, respec- 
tively: 
(2.3) 
The ‘tax-base’ effect, 6’, is defined by 
(Yq6f = pJ + p,a + p,k (2.4) 
The three terms at the right-hand side of (2.4) stand for the effects on the base of, 
respectively, the labor tax, the environmental tax on household consumption, and 
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Table 2 
The model in relative changes 
Firms 
Supply of domestic commodity 
Labor demand 
Demand for capital services 
_ _ _ _ 
Y = a,,L, + cx,,E + cxk K (11.1) 
id = f+ r_++;- F//,+ (Y,G - F//)1 (II.21 
~=P+v,C#/-il+--- Qef La,- a,qfl@J- a (11.3) 
“ef + @k 
Demand for polluting inputs 
Non-profit condition Fy = cyrrPf+ cu,&+ qi (11.5) 
Before-tax wage rate P/=F,+i, (11.6) 
Price of polluting inputs faced by firms p,f = (1 - L)gC + i, 
Pi 
(II.71 
Households 
Budget constraint for households Pq+Q=I;,+i,y (II.81 
Labor supply L, = O,,fi; (1?9) 
Demand for the ‘clean’ commodity c: = Q +(1- &,rr,(Fd” - FC, (11.10) 
by households 
Demand for the polluting commodity 6 = fj - @C cr&Pj - PC> (11.11) 
by households 
Price level of the consumption bundle l$ = C&P;, +(1- r#J,,pd” 01.12) 
Real after-tax wage rate P; = rjl - P, (II.131 
Household price for polluting 
consumption commodities jt = l-5 P,+ id 
( 1 Pd” 
(II.141 
Government 
Balanced budget a&F8 + 6) = CX~,Z~ + adhid + a,Jil + p,E 
+ &L5 + p,@, + L) (11.15) 
Equilibrium 
Labor-market i, = z, (II.161 
Walrus law 
Balance of payments 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Environmental quality 
A=-e&t@ (11.18) 
Endogenous uariables. 
Exogenous uariables: 
P,=P,=r=P,=P,=P,=d=o,~~,7,>0 
Notation Table II: 
Taxes: F, = 
At, 4 4 -,~,=--,id=- 
1+ 1, Pd Pd” 
Basic parameters 
(T, = substitution elasticity between labor and the composite production factor in production 
o,, = substitution elasticity between capital and polluting inputs in production 
as = substitution elasticity between dirty and clean consumption commodities 
oU = substitution elasticity between leisure and consumption 
f3, = elasticity that measures the relative change in M due to a rise in E 
0, = elasticity that measures the relative change in M due to a rise in D 
au/aM M 
7, = au/aQ Q 
- - the marginal rate of substitution between M and Q, multiplied by M/Q 
6 = L, / V labor-leisure ratio 
Derived parameters 
0, = l/(1 + 8) income elasticity of labor supply 
6, = oU 0, uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply 
l3* 11 = O1! + 19, compensated wage elasticity of labor supply 
a,* 
ak ‘Yef 01 
=-a+-- 
oIk + cYef n ak + “<f “/f 
Z = cYd + (Y, 
R = P, + P, + Pd 
det =Z+O,R-0zR 
Shares 
OI I, = P/L/P,Y 
%?f = P$/P,vY 
a, = P<E/P,Y 
ak = rK/P,Y 
ag = PgG/P,Y 
bd = t,D/P,Y 
= t<E/P,Y 
= t,PlL/P,Y 
adh = P,hD/P,Y 
ad = P,D/P,Y 
% = P4Q/P,Y = P,L/P,Y 
a, = P,C/P,Y 
@C = UC/a4 
the environmental tax levied on firm input. Intuitively, the tax-base effect repre- 
sents the consequences of a different tax mix for the efficiency of the tax system 
as an instrument to raise revenue. In particular, an erosion of the tax base indicates 
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that the tax system becomes less efficient as a revenue-raising device as higher tax 
rates are required to collect the same amount of revenue. Consequently, although it 
collects the same overall revenues, the government has to impose higher marginal 
Table 3 
Keduced-form coefficients a 
id i, 
F 
i 
E 
i 
u 
@!/ Pd 4, uq - 
det 
<o 
e//~d~c”q 
- <0 
det 
(1+ Q%,)P,&q - -CO 
det 
- 4,~q < 0 
Cl+ M&W, - <o 
det 
+(1- #J& > 0 
P~cbr~, <o -- 
det 
Pd&~q <o -- 
det 
+(I-q>o 
0 
+ Pd+c% >o 
det 
-(I-&I<0 
+ q[O,O,, 4~ H,(l + &,)I 
det 
@// P, 4 --<o 
det 
%f 
---a,<0 
alf 
@rr PPP 
---0 
det 
or/ P, 6 
------<o 
det 
- v,* < 0 
a;, - q* > ? < 0 
- (1+ @%,)/e? < o 
det 
Pe 4+ 
--<o 
det 
PC ff,* 
-----<o 
det 
%f 
--<o 
aIf 
-?!<o 
a/f 
Pe a,* +->o 
det 
+ q[@,e,, + @d(l + &,)I 
P‘, a,* 
->o det 
a det = Z t 0,R - HER. 
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taxes. Accordingly, the loss in private income in excess of the collected revenue, 
i.e. the marginal excess burden, rises. 
The tax-base effect (2.4) is equal to the relative change in real after-tax wages 
(see Appendix B). 
(2-9 
Accordingly, households suffer a loss in income if the tax system becomes a less 
efficient instrument to finance public spending. The overall excess burden (2.2) 
amounts to the sum of effects on real wage income, p,“, and environmental 
income (2.3). Thus, even though households may suffer a decline in real wage 
income due to a less efficient tax system, they may nevertheless gain in terms of 
overall utility if a rise in environmental income more than offsets the adverse 
effect on wage income. 
3. The case without initial environmental taxes 
This section discusses how the endogenous variables are affected in the case 
where environmental taxes are introduced in an equilibrium without any environ- 
mental taxes (i.e. Pd = p, = 0). 
Tax on the polluting consumption commodity 
The first column of Table 3 (the first and second rows with Pd = 0) reveals that 
in this case the introduction of a small environmental tax on households (with the 
revenue used to lower the tax rate on labor) affects neither employment nor 
production. Intuitively, this tax does not directly impact production. Hence, the 
marginal productivity of labor and, therefore, the before-tax wage, Pf, and the 
demand for labor remain unaffected: 
P/f= 0. (3.1) 
The lower tax on labor income allows for a rise in the market price of labor (i.e. 
the wage after labor taxes but before (indirect) consumption taxes), P,: 
P, = -it (3.4 
However, the wage rate that affects the incentives to supply labor (see expression 
(II.9) in Table 2) is not the market wage but the real after-tax wage (i.e. the wage 
after not only labor taxes but also (indirect) consumption taxes), PT. The 
environmental tax on households drives a wedge between the market wage and the 
real after-tax wage: 
(3.3) 
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Accordingly, the wedge between the before-tax and real after-tax wages consists 
of not only the distortionary tax on labor but also the environmental tax on 
consumption: 
(3.4) 
Whether replacing the labor tax by the environmental tax stimulates labor supply 
by raising the real after-tax wage depends on whether lower taxes on labor more 
than offset the effect of the higher environmental tax on the overall wedge (3.4). 
In order to find the cut in labor taxes made possible by the higher environmental 
tax, one needs the budget constraint of the government: 8 
El+ (1- C$&= -Lt. (3.5) 
The right-hand side of (3.5) equals the tax base effect. This term is zero if 
employment is unaffected and if there are no initial environmental taxes. Accord- 
ingly, the higher environmental tax exactly offsets the effect of the lower labor tax 
on the wedge between the before- and after-tax real wage. Indeed, given the 
constraint of revenue neutrality and the same bases for the taxes on consumption 
and labor income, replacing the tax on labor income by an indirect (environmen- 
tal> tax on consumption affects only the composition of the wedge between before- 
and after-tax wages without affecting the overall magnitude of this tax distortion 
(see also Poterba (1991, p. 19)). 
Tax on the polluting input into production 
The second column of Table 3 provides the results for an environmental tax on 
production. Also this tax leaves employment unaffected (as /3, = 0). The reasons 
are as follows. The production tax reduces the demand for polluting inputs, which 
contributes to a cut in domestic production. Hence, labor productivity falls if 
employment remains constant. This, in turn, causes a decline in the before-tax 
wage. In particular, the non-profit condition (11.5) yields the following relationship 
between the tax on the polluting input and the before-tax wage: 
(3.6) 
Accordingly, the input tax is borne by the immobile factor labor; since both 
polluting inputs and capital are perfectly mobile internationally, they can shift the 
entire burden of the tax to labor. 
In order to determine the impact on labor supply, we need to examine the effect 
on the real after-tax wage. This effect corresponds to that on the market wage 
because the environmental tax on households, and therefore the consumption price 
’ This equation follows from substituting (3.2) into (11.15) in Table 2 and using the definition of the 
tax-base effect (2.4). 
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Table 4 
The marginal excess burden 6 a 
% aq det 
index, is unchanged. How the market wage is affected depends on the balance 
between, on the one hand, a lower before-tax wage and, on the other hand, the cut 
in the labor tax allowed by the additional revenues from the environmental tax on 
production: 
(3.7) 
The public-budget constraint (11.15) yields the following relationship between the 
cut in the tax rate on labor and the rise in the environmental tax on production: 
(3.8) 
The tax-base effect on the right-hand side of (3.8) is zero if employment does not 
change because the initial environmental taxes are zero (see (2.4)). Hence, by 
combining (3.7) and (3.8), one finds that the after-tax wage is not affected; given 
the constraint of revenue neutrality, the adverse effect of the lower before-tax 
wage on the after-tax wage is exactly offset by the positive effect of lower taxes 
on labor income. In a small open economy, substituting a labor tax by a tax on 
polluting inputs amounts to substituting an implicit tax for an explicit tax on labor. 
Hence. the overall tax burden on labor is unaffected. 
Welfare effects 
Starting from an equilibrium without any environmental taxes, the overall 
welfare effects of small increases in these taxes are positive (see Table 4). 
A.L. Bouenberg, R_A. de Mooij/European Journal of Political Economy 10 (1994) 655-683 669 
Whereas environmental taxes do not affect employment and, therefore, the distor- 
tion in the labor market, they do alleviate the environmental distortion by cutting 
pollution. In other words, small environmental taxes benefit the environment 
without affecting the capacity of the tax system to raise revenue, as the tax-base 
effect is zero. 
4. The case with positive initial environmental taxes 
The previous section showed that, starting from a situation without any 
environmental taxes, a small increase in these taxes would not affect employment 
and would enhance welfare. This result, however, holds only for very small 
environmental taxes. In order to gain some insight into the effects of large 
environmental taxes, this section explores the effects of a marginal increase in 
environmental taxes, starting from an equilibrium in which environmental taxes 
are positive. 
4.1. Tax on the polluting consumption commodity 
Effects on employment 
For the case where the initial environmental taxes are positive (i.e. Pd > 01, the 
first and second rows of the first column in Table 3 show that an increase in the 
consumption tax on polluting commodities reduces both employment and produc- 
tion if the uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply is positive (i.e. Ba > 0). 
The rest of this paper assumes that the labor-supply curve is indeed upward-bend- 
ing because most empirical studies yield positive estimates for this elasticity. 9 
It may seem surprising that uncompensated rather than compensated elasticities 
determine the response of employment. With exogenous government spending on 
public goods, a first-order income effect would not be expected. However, the 
environmental tax reform raises the supply of the public good of the environment. 
In this way, it raises the overall tax burden and imposes a first-order income loss 
on private agents. Indeed, the appearance of the uncompensated elasticities is 
consistent with the literature on the marginal cost of public funds. This literature 
shows that uncompensated rather than compensated elasticities are relevant in 
computing the marginal cost of public funds as long as the funds are used to 
finance public goods that are weakly separable from private goods (see Ballard 
and Fullerton (1992)). If public spending were a perfect substitute for private 
income, in contrast, compensated elasticities would be relevant. In that case, there 
would be no first-order income effect as the benefit of additional public spending 
9 Estimates for the wage elasticity of labor supply for men tend to be very small. However, the 
corresponding elasticity for women is generally estimated to be positive. See, e.g., Hausman (1985). 
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would offset the costs of the higher tax burden. We have assumed, however, that 
the natural environment is weakly separable from private commodities. Hence, 
uncompensated elasticities are relevant. 
The negative effect on production and employment is due to a reduction in the 
real after-tax wage and, therefore, the incentives to supply labor. The negative 
effect on the real after-tax wage comes about because the lower tax rate on labor 
income does not fully compensate workers for the adverse effect of the higher 
environmental tax on their real after-tax wage. This incomplete offset is due to the 
erosion of the base of the environmental tax. In particular, the higher environmen- 
tal tax induces households to switch from polluting to non-polluting consumption 
commodities. If the initial tax rate on the polluting commodities is positive, this 
behavioral effect erodes the base of the environmental tax and, therefore, produces 
a negative tax-base effect (i.e. 6’ < 0). lo Expressions (3.4) and (3.5) indicate that 
the replacement of labor taxes by environmental taxes on consumption widens the 
wedge between the before- and real after-tax wages (i.e. pf - F,” > 0) on account 
of this negative effect on the tax base. Thus, if it needs to maintain overall tax 
revenues, the government is unable to reduce the labor tax sufficiently to offset the 
adverse effect of the higher environmental tax on the real after-tax wage. The 
resulting lower income from an additional unit of work reduces labor supply and, 
therefore, employment. 
Parameters impacting the adverse employment effect 
The magnitude of the adverse employment effect depends, apart from the 
uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply, on both the initial environmental 
tax and the substitution elasticity in consumption between the polluting and 
non-polluting commodities. A higher initial tax rate strengthens the adverse 
revenue effects of the erosion of the base of the environmental tax, thereby 
reducing the room to cut the tax on labor income. This negatively affects after-tax 
wages and, therefore, harms the incentives to supply labor. 
A higher substitution elasticity between polluting and non-polluting commodi- 
ties raises not only the positive effects on environmental quality, but also the 
adverse effects on the incentives to supply labor. Intuitively, it strengthens the 
erosion of the base of the environmental tax, thereby limiting the scope to reduce 
taxes on labor income. Thus, a fundamental trade-off exists between positive 
environmental effects and adverse effects on the incentives to supply labor; the 
more substantial the beneficial environmental effects of a given tax on polluting 
” In the absence of environmental externalities, the optimal commodity tax structure would not 
differentiate between polluting and non-polluting commodities because the utility structure implies that 
the substitution elasticities between the untaxed commodity (leisure) and the two consumption 
commodities are equal. Indeed, the effect of consumption taxes on the base of the labor tax depends 
only on the average tax rate on consumption and not on how the overall tax burden is distributed over 
the two commodities. 
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consumption commodities are, the larger become the adverse effects on the 
incentives to supply labor. 
Another important determinant of the adverse employment effect is the size of 
the public sector, which is closely related to the term R in the denominator of the 
reduced form. In particular, a larger revenue requirement due to a higher level of 
public spending implies that an environmental tax yields a larger adverse effect on 
employment. The reason is that the environmental tax becomes a less effective 
instrument for raising additional revenue if a larger public sector requires higher 
initial tax rates on labor and the polluting commodities. Intuitively, how effective 
higher environmental tax rates are in raising additional public revenues depends on 
the balance between, on the one hand, larger revenues from a given tax base and, 
on the other hand, smaller revenues on account of behavioral changes that erode 
the tax bases of pre-existing taxes. 
The relative importance of the second effect (i.e. the tax-base effect) on 
revenues depends on both the size of the initial tax rates and the strength of the 
behavioral changes. In the case of a higher environmental tax, two behavioral 
changes shrink the tax base. First, as discussed above, a change in the composition 
of the consumption basket away from the polluting commodity erodes the base of 
the environmental tax. The revenue impact of this first behavioral change depends 
on the initial tax rate on the polluting consumption commodity. 
The second behavioral effect reducing the tax base is the adverse employment 
effect. In particular, a larger term R (corresponding to higher initial tax rates) 
implies that a fall in employment reduces revenues from labor taxes and environ- 
mental taxes more substantially. Consequently, in the presence of a larger public 
sector, which is associated with a larger value for R, higher environmental taxes 
are less effective in raising additional public revenue because they harm employ- 
ment and, therefore, erode the bases of higher pre-existing taxes. This adversely 
affects revenue and further diminishes the scope for reducing taxes on labor, 
thereby negatively affecting labor-supply incentives. ” 
Welfare effects 
The overall welfare effects are given in table 4. In the ‘first-best’ case, in which 
there is no need to finance public spending through distortionary taxation (i.e. 
*’ The model is unstable if the adverse revenue effect of an eroding tax base exceeds the positive 
revenue effect of a higher tax rate on a given tax base. In that case, the government is beyond the top 
of the Laffer curve of the environmental tax and det = Z - O,,R < 0. Hence, the tax base of the labor 
tax, Z, which captures the revenue-raising capacity of a (direct or indirect) tax on labor income under 
the assumption of no behavioral changes, is smaller than the term O,,R, which represents the effect of 
behavioral changes in labor supply on the tax revenues from the existing tax system. 
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t, = 01, the environmental tax levied on households should be set so that it fully 
internalizes the external effects of pollution. This yields the following optimality 
condition: l2 
t d aq _=- 
pa! Ted. adh (4.1) 
If the environmental tax is set at this level, a marginal decline in the environmental 
tax would not affect overall welfare if the government requires only the Pigovian 
tax to finance its spending, so that the labor-market distortion is absent (i.e. 
t, = 0). The adverse welfare effects associated with a dirtier environment would 
exactly offset the positive effects on welfare due to an expansion of the tax base. 
In this ‘first-best’ case, labor supply and employment would rise as a consequence 
of the lower environmental tax. However, without an initial (distortionary) direct 
tax on labor, higher employment would not raise welfare because the social 
opportunity costs of additional employment would exactly offset the social bene- 
fits. 
In the case where financing of public spending requires a distortionary tax on 
labor, in contrast, overall welfare would rise if the government would marginally 
reduce the environmental tax below the level that fully internalizes the external 
effects of pollution (and would, at the same time, raise the tax rate on labor, t,, to 
offset the revenue losses). Intuitively, in the first-best optimum, the environmental 
benefits exactly balance the costs of the eroding tax base of the environmental tax 
itself. In a ‘second-best’ case, in which distortionary taxes are required to raise 
public revenue, however, one should examine not only how the environmental tax 
impacts overall tax revenue through its effect on its own base, but also how such a 
tax affects overall revenue by impacting the bases of other taxes, and thereby the 
capacity of the rest of the tax system to raise revenue. In particular, in the presence 
of a distortionary tax on labor, the substitution of an environmental tax for a 
distortionary labor tax erodes the tax base of the labor tax because employment 
declines. The environmental tax thus reduces the capacity of the tax system to 
yield public revenues over and above the revenues from the environmental taxes 
themselves. Hence, reducing the environmental tax below its ‘first-best’ level and 
replacing the revenues by labor taxation would raise welfare because it would 
alleviate the distortions associated with the financing of public goods. Compared 
to the ‘first-best’ case, therefore, the optimal environmental tax would fall if a 
distortionary tax on labor were needed to finance public spending. Indeed, a 
Pigovian tax, which is set at a level to fully internalize the environmental damage, 
is suboptimal in the presence of distortionary taxes aimed at raising revenue. This 
argument resembles that of Buchanan (1972), who argued that a Pigovian tax may 
I2 This expression does not provide for an explicit solution for the optimal environmental tax because 
the terms at the right-hand side of (4.1) depend on the tax. 
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not be optimal if a polluting commodity is supplied by a monopolist. Whereas 
Buchanan dealt with the market imperfection of a monopoly power, this paper 
focusses on a tax distortion in the labor market. In both cases, however, market 
imperfections tend to reduce the optimal size of the environmental tax as com- 
pared to the ‘first-best’ case in which distortions other than the environmental 
externalities are absent. 
If the environmental tax is set below its ‘first-best’ optimum (i.e. the right-hand 
side of (4.1) exceeds the left-hand side), a higher tax yields ambiguous welfare 
effects because it reduces not only pollution but also employment. On the one 
hand, a higher environmental tax enhances welfare by reducing pollution and 
alleviating the environmental distortion. On the other hand, however, the tax 
harms welfare by reducing employment, thereby worsening the labor-market 
distortion. Indeed, this is a classic second-best result; reducing one distortion in an 
economy with remaining distortions does not necessarily yield positive welfare 
effects. 
4.2. Tax on the polluting input into production 
Effects on employment 
As regards the environmental tax levied on inputs into production, the first row 
in the second column of Table 3 reveals that also this tax harms employment if the 
initial tax is positive (i.e. /3, > 0). In fact, the reduced form for employment 
resembles that corresponding to an environmental tax on households; both the 
initial rate of the environmental tax and the revenue requirement raise the adverse 
employment effect. Here, the relevant substitution elasticity, a:, is a composite of 
the substitution elasticities in production: 
*= ak “ef ai 
fli 
ffk +  aef 
all + 
ak + aef %f’ 
(4.2) 
Just as in the case of a tax on households, the negative effect on employment 
originates in a fall in the real after-tax wage and the associated adverse effects on 
the incentives to supply labor. The reason for the decline in the marginal income 
from work is that the production tax reduces the demand for polluting inputs. This 
adversely affects real labor income through two channels. First, as explained in the 
previous section, it decreases the marginal productivity of labor and, therefore, the 
before-tax wage. Secondly, the higher environmental tax erodes its own base. If 
the initial tax rate on the polluting input is positive, the smaller tax base reduces 
revenue, thereby producing a negative tax-base effect (i.e. 6’ < 0). Accordingly, 
given the constraint of revenue neutrality, the government cannot cut the tax rate 
on labor income sufficiently to fully offset the adverse effect of the fall in 
before-tax wages on the after-tax wage. Indeed, expressions (3.7) and (3.8) reveal 
that the after-tax wage declines if the tax base of the initial tax system shrinks (i.e. 
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P < 0). l3 High initial tax rates (i.e. a high value of R) exacerbate the adverse 
revenue effects of the fall in employment. 
Welfare effects 
The welfare effects of the production tax are contained in Table 4. Just as in the 
case of an environmental tax on consumption, a trade-off exists between environ- 
mental benefits and the worsening of the tax distortion in the labor market on 
account of a smaller tax base. The effect on the labor-market distortion is small if 
firms have little scope to substitute capital and labor for polluting inputs (i.e. a)* 
is small). In that case, however, also the environmental benefits are small. A 
fundamental conflict thus exists between the objectives of improving environmen- 
tal quality and minimizing the costs of financing public spending. 
The relative importance of the effect on the labor-market distortion depends 
importantly on the overall revenue requirement. Accordingly, a higher level of 
public spending reduces the welfare gains from switching from labor to environ- 
mental taxation. Indeed, such a change in the tax mix may harm welfare, even 
though the initial environmental tax is below the level that fully internalizes the 
external costs of pollution (i.e. t,/Pf> < ~f2e,(aq/a,f). 
4.3. Environmental taxes: No double dividend 
These results imply that the ‘double-dividend’ story fails. Pre-existing tax 
distortions in the labor market reduce rather than enhance the attractiveness of 
environmental policy, in general, and of a heavy reliance on environmental taxes, 
in particular. The fundamental reason is that the environment is a collective good; 
all residents benefit - irrespective of the amount of labor they supply. Indeed, an 
improvement in the environment can be interpreted as an increase in the supply of 
collective goods. All public goods, including the cleaner environment, are ulti- 
mately paid for by the immobile production factor, labor. Hence, the costs 
associated with a cleaner environment reduce the incentives to supply labor at the 
margin, thereby contracting the base of the labor tax and raising the marginal 
efficiency costs of financing (other) public spending. 
In particular, environmental taxes reduce after-tax wages on two accounts. 
First, labor pays for the public goods supplied by the government, as all taxes 
required to finance public spending are ultimately borne by labor. Second, from 
the point of view of financing public spending with the least costs to real after-tax 
13 Accordingly, directly taxing labor yields a higher after-tax wage than taxing labor indirectly by 
taxing the polluting inputs into production. The reason is that the tax on the mobile inputs is borne by 
immobile labor. Furthermore, unlike a direct tax on labor income, the input tax distorts the production 
process, at least if one abstracts from the environmental benefits. This result is closely related to that 
derived by Diamond and Mirrlees (1971). They show that aggregate production efficiency is desirable 
in the presence of optimal commodity taxation. See also Gordon (1986). 
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wages, environmental taxes do not tax labor ‘efficiently;’ they not only reduce the 
after-tax wage, but also ‘distort’ either the composition of the consumption basket 
or the production process. Although these ‘distortions’ reduce the real after-tax 
income from work, they also do contribute to a higher environmental quality. The 
positive welfare effects associated with higher environmental quality, however, are 
public and independent of labor supply. In this way, the costs of improving the 
environment are borne by marginal labor supply. Thus, labor pays not only for the 
public goods provided through the public budget but also for the costs incurred by 
the private sector in improving environmental quality. Indeed, the use of environ- 
mental taxes implies that the private sector, in fact, provides the collective good of 
the environment. Accordingly, the costs of ‘producing’ the collective good of 
higher environmental quality do not feature on the government budget and are, 
therefore, ‘hidden.’ 
These results are consistent with the optimal-tax results derived in a partial- 
equilibrium framework by Sandmo (1975). I4 This study analyses the case of a 
government employing its tax system to simultaneously achieve two objectives: 
first, to satisfy its revenue requirement and, second, to internalize external effects. 
It derives the optimal-tax rate for an externality-creating commodity as the 
weighted average of two terms: first, the marginal social damage of the polluting 
commodity and, second, an inverse elasticity formula familiar from the theory of 
optimal taxation. The weight of the marginal social damage decreases as the 
revenue requirement increases. Intuitively, an environmental tax reduces pollution 
by inducing taxpayers to avoid taxes. Tax avoidance not only reduces pollution, 
however, but also requires the government to levy higher distortionary taxes to 
finance its own spending. Accordingly, the larger the government’s revenue needs 
are (and hence the higher the distortionary taxes need to be), the less the 
government can afford tax differentiation aimed at environmental protection. 
Indeed, marginal tax revenue becomes more valuable if the government has to rely 
on distortionary taxes to finance its spending. The optimal environmental tax 
balances the social costs of pollution against the social benefits from additional tax 
revenues. Therefore, the higher the social value attached to tax revenue, the higher 
the marginal social costs of pollution have to be to justify environmental taxes. 
There exists thus a basic conflict between using the tax system to achieve the twin 
objectives of raising revenue and improving environmental quality. 
5. Extensions 
The analysis in this paper could be extended in several directions. An extension 
favorable to the double-dividend argument, at least from the point of view of 
l4 See also Bovenberg and Van der Ploeg (1994). 
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national welfare, would be to relax the small-economy assumptions by reducing 
the degree of international mobility of commodities, polluting inputs and capital. 
This would enable the country to shift some of the burden of the environmental 
taxes onto the foreign country by changing the terms of trade. From the point of 
view of global welfare, this would merely amount to redistributing income away 
from foreigners toward domestic residents. Whether this would actually improve 
global efficiency would depend on the distortions and behavioral responses, both 
domestically and abroad 15. 
Similarly, if the country were in a position to affect the world interest rate, an 
environmental tax on production may be borne in part by savers. Whether this 
would improve overall efficiency would depend on, among other things, both the 
elasticity of saving and the existing taxes on capital income. An analysis of these 
issues would require a dynamic model with capital accumulation. Modelling 
overlapping generations within such an intertemporal framework would allow one 
to deal with issues of intertemporal efficiency and intergenerational equity related 
to both the timing of taxes and lags between emissions and environmental quality. 
Another extension in favor of the double dividend is contained in Bovenberg 
and De Mooij (1993) who distinguish two sources of household income: labor and 
transfer incomes. Hence, the economic burden associated with a cleaner environ- 
ment can be shifted towards transfer incomes. In that case, efficiency may improve 
and thus a double dividend be realized. However, the income distribution between 
households is likely to become less equitable. Hence, there is a fundamental 
trade-off between equity and efficiency. 
Other extensions would be unfavorable to the double-dividend argument. To 
illustrate, other labor-market imperfections, such as real-wage rigidities, would 
tend to raise the costs of environmental taxes. Furthermore, the quality of the 
environment could be made complementary to leisure. In that case, an improve- 
ment in environmental quality would reduce the supply of labor through another 
channel. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper suggests that second-best considerations play an important role in 
setting environmental policy, in general, and in implementing environmental taxes, 
in particular. Whereas Buchanan (1972) pointed this out for the case of a 
I5 It is highly unlikely that the industrialized countries would be able to shift the costs of the 
environmental policies to the LDCs. In contrast, the industrialized countries most likely would have to 
bribe the LDCs to participate in international agreements on global and continental environmental 
problems. Hence, workers in industrialized countries arc likely to bear a substantial part of the burden 
of cutting pollution in not only the industrial countries but also the LDCs. 
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monopolist supplying a polluting commodity, this paper explores how tax distor- 
tions associated with the financing of public spending impact the effects of 
environmental policy. It demonstrates that an increase in environmental taxes 
toward a level that fully internalizes the social costs of pollution may no longer be 
welfare improving if the government requires distortionary taxes to finance its 
spending. Oates and Schwab (1988) also highlight the interaction between envi- 
ronmental policy and tax distortions. They show that, from the point of view of 
global efficiency, communities that require high distortionary taxes on mobile 
capital should set relatively lax environmental standards. This would serve to 
offset the distortions introduced by fiscal policy. I6 
High estimates for the marginal efficiency costs of the existing tax system are 
sometimes used in support of environmental taxes (see e.g. Pearce (1991) and 
Oates (1991)). This paper has shown that such arguments are misleading because 
they ignore the costs of environmental taxes in terms of exacerbating the pre-exist- 
ing distortions associated with the financing of public spending through distor- 
tionary taxation. In particular, environmental taxes typically render the tax struc- 
ture a less efficient instrument for raising revenue and, therefore, increase the 
welfare costs of financing public spending. The additional costs of environmental 
taxes due to less efficient revenue-raising are likely to be especially high if the 
marginal efficiency costs of the existing tax system are substantial. Therefore, the 
higher the efficiency costs of the existing tax structure are, the higher the 
environmental benefits need to be in order to justify the additional costs of 
environmental taxes in terms of a less efficient mechanism for financing public 
spending. Indeed, high estimates for the efficiency costs of existing taxes weaken 
rather than strengthen the case for environmental taxation. 
A higher priority for the public good of environmental quality is likely to 
require a heavier reliance on environmental taxes. This change in the tax structure, 
however, typically raises the marginal efficiency costs of financing public spend- 
ing, especially if environmental taxes are successful in reducing pollution. Intu- 
itively, environmental taxes increase the supply of environmental services, thus 
boosting the overall supply of public goods, and therefore raising the marginal 
costs of public goods provision more generally. In this way, the public good of a 
cleaner natural environment directly competes with other public goods. I7 Indeed, 
the services from the environmental quality are not free. On the contrary, since 
” In the context of policy competition, Oates and Schwab (1988) also found that competing 
jurisdictions set inefficiently low environmental standards if these communities have to rely on a tax on 
mobile capital to finance their public spending. 
” The condition of the natural environment in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union provides 
a dramatic example of this. In these countries, a large public sector has crowded out a clean 
environment. 
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these services are public, they are expensive - especially in those countries with 
large public sectors that require high distortionary taxes. 
Notation 
Y= 
L,= 
K= 
E= 
P= 
p;f = 
t, = 
P, = 
Pi= 
P, = 
t, = 
r= 
v= 
A= 
L, = 
M= 
Q= 
P, = 
D= 
c= 
PC = 
Pd” = 
Pd = 
I, = 
G= 
Pg = 
supply of the domestic commodity 
domestic labor demand 
domestic demand for capital services 
domestic demand for polluting inputs 
price of commodity Y 
before-tax wage rate 
ad valorem tax rate on labor income 
after-tax wage rate 
price of polluting inputs faced by firms 
market price of polluting inputs 
specific tax rate on polluting inputs 
rate of return on capital 
household demand for leisure 
marginal (private) utility of income 
labor supply 
environmental quality 
sub-utility from consuming private commodities 
shadow price of Q 
consumption of the polluting commodity by households 
consumption of the ‘clean’ commodity by households 
price of the non-polluting consumption commodity 
price of the polluting consumption commodity faced by households 
market price of the polluting consumption commodity 
tax rate on the polluting consumption commodity 
public demand in real terms 
price of public goods 
Appendix A: Analytical solution of the reduced form equations 
We write Eq. (11.17) for the case where the prices of tradables do not change 
and 6=0: 
F= c& + CY,B + (YJz+ cu,ti. (A.11 
Using (A.l) and the equation for the supply of goods (II.l), one can eliminate P: 
CX& = - p,g + CYy,L5 + LX& (A.21 
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where we have used that 
CY ef =CY,+p,. (A.3) 
Eq. (A.21 can be interpreted as an expression for labor demand. We now express 
the three endogenous variables at the right-hand side of Eq. (A.2) in terms of i 
and pl”. 
To find the expression for 6, we first subtract (11.2) from (11.4) and use (11.7) to 
eliminate pi. If the prices for tradables do not change, this yields 
ffk 
a;, + 
“ef 
“ef + ffk aef + ffk 
(+I te. l- 
Substituting (11.7) into the non-profit condition (11.5) yields 
(A.41 
(A.5) 
Substituting (AS) into (A.4) to eliminate p{, one derives 
_E=f.-aJ”ie, 
where 
(A4 
*= 
[ 
ak ff ef UTI 
Cl 
ffk +  “ef 
an + 1 ak + “ef “lf . (A.7) 
To find c and 5 in terms of p; and i, we eliminate 8 in (11.10) and (11.11) by 
substituting the household budget constraint (11.8) and use (11.13) for Fy: 
C=P; +L + (l- $,)gqid, (A@ 
r5 =F; +i: - +,ffqid. (A.9) 
Here, we have used the price equations (11.12) and (11.14) to rewrite pb and p,” in 
terms of id. Substituting (A.61, (AS), and (A.9) into (A.2), one derives: 
CY~~L=[CY~+(Y,][F;+L] -p,~+p,a::i~+[(l-~,)(y,-~,(yd]~~i~ 
(A.lO) 
We can write the last term in square brackets at the right-hand side of (A.lO) as 
P,hD P,C P,C P,D P,C t,D 
(l-~c)(y,-~~(yd=-----=---= 
f’,Q PyY p,Q PJ P,Q PyY 4cpd’ 
(A.ll) 
Using (A.111, we can now rewrite labor demand in (A.lO) as 
~-Z~~=4~,du~id+p,~,~i~, (A.12) 
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where 
z= a,+ a!,, (A.13) 
R = qf+ p, -Z= p,+ p, + Pd. (A.14) 
The term Z in (A.13) measures real after-tax expenditure of households as a result 
of additional employment. R in (A.14) represents the marginal size of the public 
sector, i.e. the additional tax revenue due to an additional unit of employment. 
Labor supply (11.9) yields 
i;, = e,,F;. 
We write (A.12) and (A.15) in matrix notation as 
(A.15) 
(A.16) 
We can solve for the endogenous variables by inverting the matrix on the left-hand 
side of (A.16): 
(A.17) 
det=Z- B,,R. (A.18) 
The term ‘det’ must be positive for the equilibrium to be stable. This determi- 
nant consists of two elements. The first term on the right-hand side of (A.18) can 
be interpreted as the real value of after-tax wage income. This net private income 
constitutes the tax base for the public sector. The second term stands for the 
impact of higher real after-tax wages on tax revenues through its behavioral effect 
on labor supply and, therefore, the base of the tax system. If 8,, and R are large 
relative to Z, the economy may be unstable. Intuitively, a lower real after-tax 
wage may turn the economy into a downward spiral. This is because lower 
after-tax wages reduce the incentive to supply labor, thereby reducing tax revenues 
through an erosion of the tax base. Hence, the tax on labor needs to rise in order to 
meet the revenue constraint. This further reduces net wages and, therefore, the tax 
base. The instability due to a negative slope of the ‘Laffer curve’, can occur only 
if the public sector is large relative to net private income (i.e. R is large relative to 
Z). Moreover, private behavior should be sensitive to tax incentives (i.e. 8,, is 
large). 
The reduced form equations for p; and i can now be computed from (A.17): 
A.L. Bouenberg, RA. de Mooij/European Journal of Political Economy 10 (1994) 655-683 681 
The other reduced-form equations can now be derived. For I? one can find the 
reduced-form equation from (A.6), by substituting (A.191 for i. 
We use (11.12), (11.131, and (11.14) to find the reduced form for P,: 
P[=P; + (1- +,&. (A.21) 
In order to express b and C in terms of the exogenous variables, one 
substitutes (A.191 and (A.20) into (A.81 and (A.91 respectively. 
For the endogenous tax rate on labor, il, we use (11.6): 
Zl=Pf-P, (A.22) 
Substituting P,f from (AS) and the reduced form for P[ into (A.221, one 
arrives at the reduced-form equation for zl. 
The demand for capital services can be rewritten by subtracting (11.3) from 
(11.2). If we substitute (11.7) and (AS) for P,f and P/ respectively, we find 
k=r, + (a;, - a,*>i,. (A.23) 
By sustituting (A.19) into (A.23), one arrives at the reduced form for Z?. 
Finally, substituting (AS) and (11.7) into (11.2), we derive the following 
equation for ?: 
(A.24) 
One arrives at the reduced form for ? by substituting (A.191 into (A.24). 
Appendix B: The excess burden 
In analogy of Keller (1980), we compute the ‘marginal’ excess burden as the 
compensating variation, which is defined as the transfer necessary to maintain, 
after a policy change, utility at its original level. For small changes, the compen- 
sating variation equals the equivalent variation. 
Accordingly, we find the compensating transfer such that, after the policy 
shock, utility is unchanged compared to the initial equilibrium, i.e. 
O=du=;dV+;dC+;dD+gdM. P.1) 
Utility maximization implies that the partial derivatives at the right-hand side of 
(B.l) are equal to A, the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the budget 
constraint, times the corresponding price (see (IlO), (1.11) and (1.12)). Hence, we 
write (B.l) as 
-hP,dL + hP,dC + hP,hdD + ZdM = 0, (B.2) 
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where we have used dL = - dV. From the household budget constraint (1.9) we 
have 
LdP, + P,dL + dp = CdP, + P,dC + DdP,” + P,hdD. WI 
Here dp is the compensating variation. Substituting (B.2) into (B.3), yields for 
dp: 
dp= -LdPl+CdPc+DdP;-g?. (B.4) 
We define the marginal excess burden, 6, as the compensating variation, d@, 
relative to household income, P,L = P,Q. This yields the following expression for 
the marginal excess burden: 
P.5) 
where we have used (11.14), XJ/aQ = AP,, and dP, = 0. Alternatively, using 
(11.13), (11.18) and the definition of 7, we can write the marginal excess burden as 
p= -P-;+7+@+e,B). (B.6) 
In order to derive the expression for the marginal excess burden in (2.1) we 
use the public budget constraint (11.15) with P, = C? = 0: 
p,L + p,E + Pdti = - p,P, - ffefie - adhid - a,$,. 
From (11.5) (11.6) and (11.7) we derive 
(B.7) 
oyt, = - arfPl - (Y i ef e’ (B.8) 
Substituting (B.8) into (B.7), using (11.13) and dividing both sides by Pq, one 
finds 
P;=&L+&,-+pdLj. 
(B.9) 
ffq (yq ffq 
According to (2.4) the right-hand side of (B.9) equals 5’. Hence, (2.5) holds. 
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